Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harrington: Resisting the Impulse to Judicially Rewrite Exclusion Clauses by Bailey, D. Heath
BYU Law Review
Volume 1998 | Issue 4 Article 5
11-1-1998
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harrington:
Resisting the Impulse to Judicially Rewrite
Exclusion Clauses
D. Heath Bailey
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
D. Heath Bailey, Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harrington: Resisting the Impulse to Judicially Rewrite Exclusion Clauses, 1998 BYU L. Rev.
1645 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1998/iss4/5
1. S ee Gra nge In s. Co. v . Br oss ea u, 776 P.2d 123,  124 (W as h. 1989); se e also
Bryan P. Wh ita ke r, Empty Hands, Deep Pockets : Tort L iabilit y a nd P ote ntial fo r
Recovery  Against Individuals  Applying Martial Arts Training in S elf-Defense , 31 GONZ.
L. REV. 413, 415 (1996). For a dis cuss ion of an ins urer ’s duty t o defend or indemni fy
an insured when a  claim is ma de, see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
2. North Carolina Farm Bu re au  Mut. Ins . Co. v. S tox, 412 S .E.2d 318, 321
(N.C. 1992).
3. S ee infra note 93 a nd a ccompa nyi ng te xt; se e also  Whita ke r, s upra note 1,
a t 416 (“Participating in an as sault . . . is considered an intentional act . . . and
would th er efore f a ll  out s ide t he  scope of  cover age.”).
4. S ee generally Whi ta ke r, s upra note 1 (providing overview of issues r elevant
to cover age dete rmi na ti ons  in  ma rti a l a rts  sel f-def en se s it ua ti ons ).
5. 565 N.W .2d 839,  840 (Mich.  1997).
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Auto-Owne rs  Insurance  Co. v. Harrington:
Resisting the Impulse to J udicially  Rewrite
Exclusion Clauses
I. INTROD UCTION
 Individuals  pur cha se l ia bility insur ance for one primar y
purpose: to shift  lia bility to an ins urer  for injur ies  they may
caus e.1 In order to protect themselves from liability for inten-
tional  injur ies , ins ur ance companie s  typica lly s ta te i n the policy
agreement tha t cover age does  not ex tend to “bodily  injur y . . .
which  is  expected or in tended by  the in sur ed . . . .”2 A policy
with such an exclusion claus e clearly does not cover injur ies
wrongfully caus ed by the intentional  torts  of an in sur ed
person.3 Over the past few deca des, however, a more difficult
iss ue ha s  arisen: whether such a clause also excludes from cov-
e rage injuries ca used by an insur ed person’s intentional acts
tak en in s elf-defense.4
This Note examines  a  ca se that wre stles  wi th this  is sue. In
Auto-Owne rs  Ins uranc e Co. v. Harr ingto n, decided J uly 29,
1997, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that, according to
the pla in  la nguage of the exclusion claus e at i ss ue, injuries
caus ed by intentional s elf-defensive a cts, even if lega lly justifi-
able, ar e excluded from covera ge; thus, an insurer ha s no duty
to defend or indemnify a n insured under s uch circumsta nces.5
Part II of this Note provides general background on how var i-
ous  sta te courts v iew the iss ue. Part III briefly outlines the
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6. State  Farm F ire & Cas. Co. v . Ma rsha ll , 554 S o. 2d 504,  505 (F la . 1989).
Whether thi s t ru ly i s a  ma jorit y r ule  is  some wha t dis pute d. S ee infra note 44.
7. Marsh all, 554 So. 2d a t 505.
8. S ee infra Section IV.A.
9. State  Fa rm  Fi re  & Cas . Co. v. Pooma ih ea la ni , 667 F. S upp. 705, 708 (D.
Haw. 1987).
10. S ee infra Sect ion IV.C.
11. S ee Transa merica Ins. Group v. Meere , 694 P.2d 181, 190 (Ariz. 1984)
(Holoh an, C.J., di ssenti ng) (“Th[is] issue . . . was decided in Loc kh art v. Allstate Ins.
Co. , 119 A riz. 150, 579 P .2d 1120 (App. 1978). Re vie w w as deni ed by  th is  court.”).
facts  in the Harrington  case a nd the court’s holding.  Part IV
ana lyzes  the court’s r ea soning in deta il , a s  well as  the reas on-
ing of other courts on both si des of the iss ue. Thi s  Note con-
cludes that  the Michigan court’s “freedom of contra ct” reas on-
ing is s ound; further, it offers a dditional  support for the view
that  injuries  caused by intentional a cts tak en in self-defense
are indeed “intended or expected” from the standpoint of the
insu red, and a re thus  properly excluded from covera ge.
II. BACKGROUND
 In holding tha t in jur ies  caus ed by i ntenti onal  acts  taken in
self-defense ar e excluded from covera ge under a n “expected or
intended injury” claus e, the Michigan S upreme Court joined
what  the Florida S upreme Court called “the majority of jur is dic-
tions.”6 While these courts  recognize a legal right of individuals
to defend th ems elv es , they genera lly point to “the  sanctity of
the parties  to freely contra ct”7 and f ind that the la nguage of the
exclusion cla us e a t is sue una mbiguousl y precludes  coverage.8
“Other jur is dictions ,” however , “do not find this  mechanica l
interpretation appr opria te”;9 these juris dictions find that  the
la nguage of such exclusion clauses  is a mbiguous a nd justify
their holdings with va rious public policy arguments.10
The law on whether intentional a cts taken in self-defense
are properl y excluded from lia bil ity covera ge is , however, still
in a  s ta te of flux. Ma ny s ta te courts ha ve yet to address  the
iss ue, and at lea st one sta te supreme court has  ch anged  its
mind  as  to how these claus es s hould be interpret ed.11 There-
fore, a lth ough thi s  Note speci fica lly examines the decision of
the Michigan S upreme Court, it has broad application; it is
simply a ma tter of time before other sta te courts a re forced to
exam ine (or reex ami ne) this is sue.
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12. 565 N.W .2d 839 (Mich.  1997).
13. S ee id.
14. S ee id. at  841.  The “Per sona l Lia bilit y” section of the  policy s ta ted:
We will pay all sums  which an insured person becomes  legally obligated
to pay  as  damag es  bec aus e of b odily  injury . . . co vered  by  this  pol icy.  
If a claim  is  mad e o r s uit is  bro ugh t agains t th e insured person for
liability  under this  cove rage, we  will de fend the  insure d pers on at our
expens e . . . .
Id.
15. Id.  
16. S ee id. at  840.
17. S ee id.
18. S ee id.
19. S ee id.
20. S ee id. at  842. Harr ington admitted in deposition testimony that he
“intentionally  pointed his gun at Tew and intended to shoot him, hoping to stop Tew’s
adv an ce towa rd the bed room window.” Id.  
III. AUTO-OWNE RS  INS URANCE CO . V. HARRINGTON12
A. Facts
 J ames  Harrington (Har rington), defendant in this  declara -
tory re lief a ction, was  the  holder  of a l ia bili ty  ins ur ance policy
iss ued by the plai ntiff, Auto-Owners  Insura nce Company (Auto-
Owners).13 Under the te rms of thi s policy, Auto-Owners  ha d a
duty to pay  dama ges res ulting from “covered” bodily injuries to
third pa rt ies  caus ed by  the ins ured a nd to defend the insur ed in
civil actions a ris ing out of such injuries .14 The policy specifically
excluded from such cover age a ny  “bodily  injur y . . . exp ec ted or
intended” by the  ins ured.15
Dur ing the a ft er noon of Augus t 1, 1989, Brian Tew  (Tew),
who was  living with Harri ngton’s neighbor, became intoxicated
and aggressive toward members of Harrington’s family.16 Tew’s
behavior became more erra tic as the evening progressed; he
threa tened to kill  Harri ngton’s nephew  and wa s la ter obser ved
firing an  automatic weapon into a near by lak e.17 In response to
these  threa ts, Harr ington prepared himself to protect his fam-
ily by ret rievi ng a s hotgun from his gara ge.18
Later  that night, Har rington’s wife observed Tew climbing
up the side of the garage towar d an upsta irs w indow where the
Harrington childr en were  located.19 As suming Tew st ill  ha d a
weapon and pla nned to har m the family, Harr ington intention-
ally  shot Tew with the shotgun, hitting him in the stomach.20
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21. S ee id. at  840.
22. S ee id.
23. Id.
24. Id.  at  842.
25. Id.  at  840. For the Michigan Court of Appeals, the question of  whether
Tew’s  inju rie s w ere  “inte nded or ex pected” hinged s imply on  whether  Harr ington “was
capable of foreseeing the consequences” of his a ctions . Auto-Owner s In s. Co. v.
Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), aff ’d, 565 N.W.2d 839 (Mich.
1997). Thus  wher e the  inju ry  is  “su bjectiv ely  . . . inten ded an d expe cted,” the fa ct
tha t the insured has  acted in “self-defense [does] not create a n exception to the
intentiona l act s e xclu si on . . . .” Id. at  110. 
26. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
27. Id. at 842S43.
Tew died as res ult of the shooting. Although Tew had no
wea pon in his possess ion at the time of the shooting, criminal
charges were not brought agains t Har rington.21
Tew’s  family brought su it agains t Har rington and Auto-
Owners  for wrongfu l death. Auto-Owners filed this action
seeking a declara tion that i t ha d no duty to defend or
indemnify.22 The insura nce company ar gued that because the
plai ntiff admittedly intended to shoot Tew, the injury was
“expected or intended” within the meaning of the exclusion
claus e, and thus  outsi de the covera ge of the policy.23 Har rington
countered that beca use hi s a ctions were ta ken in s elf-defense,
Auto-Owners s hould be required to defend him. He argued that
his  actions, while volitional, were not “‘wrongful’ or
‘unjus ti fied,’” and therefore could not result in a n “intentiona l”
injury.24
The tria l court found that Auto-Owners owed Har rington a
duty to defend. The Michigan Court of Appeals  reversed,
holding that Harrington’s a dmittedly intentional a ct fell
“squarely  within the intentional-act exclus ion.”25 The Michigan
Supr eme Court agreed, stating that  “[t]o except injurious action
tak en in self-defense from the intentional-acts exclusion would
impermissibly disr egard the clea r la nguage of the . . . contract
between insur er  and ins ur ed.”26 The court further held that
where injuries are “intentional, or at least expected,” they are
“excluded from indemnificati on covera ge, even if tak en in s elf-
defens e.”27  
B. Th e Court’s  Reas oning
The Michigan Supreme Court based its  decision that
injuries  caused by an intentional  act taken by an ins ured in
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28. Id.  at  842.
29. Id.  at  841 (quoting A uto-Owne rs  Ins . Co. v. Chur chman , 489 N.W.2d 431
(Mich. 1992)).
30. Id.
31. Id.  (quoting Raska v. Fa rm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.W.2d 440 (Mich.
1982)).
32. Auto-Owners  Ins . Co. v. Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995); s ee als o Church man, 489 N.W.2d a t 431.
33. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
34. Id.  (emphas i s  added). 
35. Id.  
36. Id.  (quoting Metropolitan Propert y & Li ab. In s. Co. v . DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d
734, 743 (Mich. 1989)). The court als o noted that “‘[t]here is  a s ignificant dif ference
between insurance contracts that exclude both intentional and exp ected injuries and
those tha t me re ly e xclu de in ten tiona l in jur ies .’” Id.  at 842 n.6 (empha si s a dded)
(quoting Frank enmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Piccard, 489 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1992)
(plurality opinion)).
self-defense fall within a n “intended or expected” exclusion
clause  primar ily on a s trict analys is of what it called the “plain
la nguage of the policy  excl us ion.”28 The court initial ly noted
tha t “[a]n insur ance policy is a n agreemen t between par ties
that  a  court i nte rpre ts  ‘much  the  same a s  any  other  contra ct’”;
as  with other contracts, the aim is to “best effectuate the intent
of the pa rt ies .”29 Thus, although a coverage exclusion clause is
“to be s tr ict ly  const rued in fa vor of the i ns ur ed,”30 such a claus e
is  va lid “‘a s  long as  it is  clear, unambiguous a nd not in
contravention of public policy .’”31 Although not expressly
included in the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Court of Appeals ,
whose decision the Supreme Court a ffirmed, als o emphas ized
that “[a]n am bigui ty  wi ll  not be cr ea ted where none exi s ts .”32
In ligh t of the se gene ra l pr inci ple s  of contr act
interpretation, the court held that the language of the exclusion
clause  was  indeed “pla in.”33 The court noted tha t the in surance
policy  “does not qualify  the in jur ies  excluded f rom cover age
with ter ms  such as  ‘wr ongful ’ or ‘unjus ti fied,’” but rather “only
distinguis hes  inju ri es  tha t a re e ither ‘inten ded or expected’
from those that a re purely accidental.”34 The policy la nguage,
the cour t rea soned, calls  for a  “subjective inquiry into the intent
or expectation of the in sur ed,”35 and requires nothing more than
a  finding that the “injuries a re the ‘natura l, fores eeable,
expected, and anticipated result of an intentional a ct.’”36 Thus,
where an ins ured “intend[s], or at lea st expect[s], that bodily
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37. Id.  at  842.
38. Id.  at  840.
39. Id.  at  842.
40. Id.
41. Id.  at  840.
42. Id.  a t 842 (quoting A uto-Owners  Ins. Co. v. Har rin gton, 538 N.W.2d 106
(Mich. Ct.  App. 1995)).
43. Id.
44. Id.  at 842 (citing Tra ns am er ica  Ins . Group v . Meer e, 694 P.2d 181 (Ari z.
1984); All st at e Ins . Co. v. Nova k, 313 N.W.2d 636 (Neb. 1981)). It is debatable
whether the Michigan rule tr uly repres ents  a majority of courts that hav e decided
this is su e. But see St at e F ar m F ir e & Cas . Co. v. Mars ha ll, 554 S o. 2d 504, 505 (F la .
1989) (“[T]he majority of jur is dict ion s . . .  hol d tha t s el f-def en se i s  not  an e xcep ti on
to the  int ent iona l a cts  excl us ion . . . .”). S ee generally  J ames  L. Rigel ha upt, J r.,
Annotation, Acts in S elf-Defense as  Within Provis ion of Liability Insurance Policy
Expres sly  Excluding Coverage for Damage or Injury Intended or Expected by Insured,
34 A.L.R.4th  761 (1981 & Supp . 1996); Whita ke r, s upra note 1,  a t 418 (stating that
“a  mi nor it y of jur is dict ion s . . .  ex clude[] cov er age in  sel f-def en se s it ua ti ons ”).
injury [will] result from”37 an i ntentional a ct, the resulti ng
injur ies  fa ll  “squa re ly  wi thin the in ten tional-a ct ex clus ion.”38
Applying these rules  to the case, the court noted that the
vol itional  nature of Har rington’s a ct was not in
dis pute—a lthough he argued that the shooting was
“reactionary ,”39 Harr ington admitted that he “intentionally
pointed his gun at Tew and intended to shoot . . . hoping to stop
[him].”40 Additiona lly, the court noted that Harrington had
“retr ieved his . . . shotgun from his gara ge” earlier  in the day
with the expectation that he might need it to defend himself
from Tew.41 From the nature of the act the court concluded that
“Har rington certainly was  awa re . . . ‘that intentionally
shooting at [Tew] would result in serious bodily harm or
dea th.’”42 Thus even if the shooting was, a s  Harri ngton claimed,
a  “justifiable res ponse to unwarranted aggression,” to except it
from the exclusion clause would “impermiss ibly disregard the
clear l angua ge of the  . . . contract.”43
While the court  recognized that other jurisdictions have
held “that a n ins ur ed’s intentiona l a ct ta ken in  sel f-defense
does  not consti tute intentional conduct,” it noted that it view ed
its  holding a s  “consona nt wi th the ma jori ty  [of the] st a te[s ].”44 It
als o noted that its holding wa s  cons is tent  wi th the r ea soning of
its  “prior determina tions that  injurious a ction by an in sur ed
who is ill or intoxicated, and subsequently absolved from civil
D:\ 1998-4\ FI NAL \ BA I-FIN .WP D J an . 8, 2001
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45. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842 n.8.
46. For an ex ampl e  of  a  typical exclusion clause, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
47. For a discuss ion of how an insurer’s duty to defend arises , see infra note
80 and accompanying text.
or criminal liability, is nonetheless excluded from covera ge”
under such a policy provision.45 
IV. ANAL Y S IS
 At first blush, the Michigan court’s holding may give rise to
some feel ings of dis comfort. Tha t a n in surance company should
have no duty to defend a s ympathetic policy holder who has
simply attempted to protect himself or his fa mily from an
as sa ult may s eem to contra dict bas ic sentimental notions of
fair ness ; indeed, a good number of juris dictions ha ve decided
this iss ue to the contra ry. This Note argues, however, that the
Michigan court wa s correct for three rea sons.
Firs t, the court’s  determina tion that inju ri es  caus ed by
intentional  acts  taken in s elf-defen se  a re “intended or expected”
and therefore excluded from covera ge comports w ith tra ditional
principles  of contract interpret ati on. The language of these
policy  exclusions is  clear a nd unambiguous;46 courts tha t find
tha t such an exclusion applies to acts tak en in self-defense
correctly apply  the common meaning of these t erms . On the
other  hand, jurisdictions which determine that covera ge exists
for such injuries s eem to ignore the rights of par ties to bargain
for contra ctual benefits and burdens and to rely on the
agreement’s  clear la nguage. In short, requiring an insurer to
defend under such circumsta nces would amount to the judicial
revis ion of a clear contract.
Second, while a n insurer ’s duty t o defend may be broader
than  its duty to indemnify, there can be no duty to defend
where there is no poss ibility that an injur y is covered under the
policy. In cases  where the delibera te nature of the act is not
dis puted, regar dless  of whether t he a ctions  of the ins ured a re
justifi ed by self-defense principles, there simply is  no poss ibility
that  the res ulta nt injury  may  be covered. On one hand, if the
intentional  act is not justified, it is  s imply an intentional tort,
obviously  outside the coverage of the policy.47 On the other
ha nd, if the a cts a re justifi ed, there is no liability and thus no
poss ibility for covera ge under the policy. With no possibility of
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48. Tra ns am eri ca  Ins . Group  v. Mee re , 694 P.2d 181, 190 (Ariz. 1984) (Holohan,
C.J.,  dis se nti ng).
49. See,  e.g., Harrington, 565 N.W.2d at 841 (“An insurance policy is an
agreement between parties  that a court interprets  ‘much the same a s any  other
contract’ to best  effe ctua te t he i nte nt of th e pa rt ies  . . . .” (quoting Auto-Owners Ins.
Co. v. Chu rch ma n, 489 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1992))). The Arizona Supreme Court
ostensibly ta kes  a di ffer ent v iew of in su ra nce policy interpretation; the court notes
tha t
[s]ome  of the cases  . . . resolve the is sue [of whether  self defense falls
within the  in te nded or ex pected in ju ry ex clus ion ] on the  fi ct ion a l basis  of
the “intent of the parties.” . . . This is an approach which we have
aba ndoned. . . . We be lieve the proper methodology is to determine the
meaning of the cl au se  . . . by examinin g the  pur pose of th e ex clus ion . . .
, the public policy considerations involved and the transa ction as a  whole.
Meere , 694 P.2d a t 185 (cita tions  omitt ed). However ,  even the Arizona court admits
tha t this approach is only valid wher e the policy term “is sus ceptible to different
const ru ctions .” Id.
50. Montr ose Chem. Corp . v.  Adm ir a l In s.  Co., 913 P.2d 878, 888 (Cal . 1995)
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1638, 1644); se e also  Espinet  v . Horvat h, 597 A.2d 307,
309 (Vt. 1991); GEORGE J . COUCH ET AL., COUCH CYCLOPEDIA  OF  INSURANCE LAW
§ 44:286 (2d ed. 1982).
51. North Carol ina  Farm Bureau Mut. Ins .  Co.  v.  Stox, 412 S.E.2d 318, 321
(N.C. 1992).
coverage regardless  of the outcome, there can be no duty to
defend or indemnify.
Finally, the a rguments  advanced by courts  to justify judicial
tinkering wi th the a bility of insurers  and insur ed persons to
freely contra ct are unpersua sive. Such justifications ignore the
clear  la ngua ge of thes e exclus ion clau ses and are simply a
reflection of preconceived and unwise judicial policy “to
distribute the  consequences  of [a] loss  on an  ins urance
company ” ra ther tha n on an i nsur ed in all  cas es.48
A. Traditional  Contract Analy s is
 Courts  rout inely  recognize tha t in sur ance policy agreements
are contracts and that policy terms a re governed by traditional
rules  of contra ct interpretation.49 Thus, policy terms are
as signed their “‘ordinary and popular’” defin itions a nd a re
given the mea ning “a la yperson  would ascribe to the
la ngua ge.”50 Alt hough most cour ts  recognize that “exclusionary
provi si ons a re not favored and . . . will be constr ued agains t the
insur er ,” this  pres umption aris es only where the langua ge of
the excl us ion is  “ambiguous .”51 Where the language of such an
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52. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 841 (quotin g Ra sk a v . Fa rm  Bur ea u Ins . Co., 314
N.W.2d 440 (Mich.  1982)).
53. S ee Grange Ins . Co. v . Brossea u,  776 P .2d 123,  124 (W ash.  1989).
54. BLACK ’S  LAW DICTIONARY  15 (6th ed. 1990). For an even more “ordinary”
definition,  s ee WEBSTER’S  NEW WORLD DICTIONARY  4 (Pocket Books  Pa per back  ed.
1995) (defini ng “acciden t” as “an  uni nte nded h ap peni ng . . . a  mis ha p . . . chance”).
55. Grange Ins . Co ., 776 P.2d a t 125 (citing Ti eton v . Gene ra l Ins . Co. of Am.,
380 P.2d 127 (Wash.  1963)).
56. Unigard Mut. Ins . Co. v. Spok an e S ch. Dis t. 8, 579 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Wash.
1978) (emphasis  added). The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington in
Grange Insurance  Co. v. Bros s eau, 776 P.2d 123 (Wash. 1989), is instructive. There,
the pl a in ti ff  in sur ance company  sought a declara tion that it had no duty to defend
an insured that intentiona l ly  shot a third party in self-defense. The court first noted
that the insurance policy in question, like the one at issue in Harrington, covered
injuries  occurring by “accident,” but excluded injuries “expected or intended” by the
insured . Id. at 124. In dete rmi ni ng th at t he  in ju rie s  we re n ot “acci dent a l,” the  court
employed a two-step analys is. Firs t, the court inquired whether the insured’s acts
giving ri se  to the i nju ry  wer e “deliber at e.” Id. at 125. Once the deliberate nature of
the act was  established, an injur y could only be conside red “accidenta l” if “‘som e
addi tiona l unexpected, independent an d unfore se en ha ppeni ng occurs  whi ch
produces  . . . inju ry  or dea th.’ ” Id.  (citin g Unigard, 579 P.2d a t 1018).
57. Harrington,  565 N.W.2d a t 841; se e also  North Carolina Fa rm Burea u Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Stox, 412 S.E.2d 318, 322 (N.C. 1994); Whita ke r, s upra note 1, a t 415.
Although th e e ffects  of s uch a n e xc lu s ion  claus e a re of te n a na ly zed s epara te ly  fr om
the ana ly s is  of the  in ju ry a s  an “acci dent ,” som e cour ts  ha ve n oted that the two
issues  a re,  in  rea li ty , two i ncarna ti ons  of the  same  ques ti on. S ee  Unigard, 579 P.2d
at 1018. 
exclusionary clause is “‘clear, unambiguous a nd not in
contravention of publ ic poli cy,’” the cl aus e wi ll be found v a lid.52
Liability insura nce policies such as the one at iss ue in
Harrington  typically limit cover age to in jur ies  that a ri se by
“accident.”53 In its ordinar y s ense, the word “accident” refers to
“an event happening without any human a gency ,”54 or  an
“unusual, unexpected, and unforeseen  ha ppening.”55 Because
the language of these insura nce policies makes clear tha t the
accidental natu re of the injury must be determined from the
point of view of the insured (as  opposed to the victim), the
Was hington Supr eme Court has  held that, in accordance with
the common definition, “an a ccident is never present wh en a
de lib erate act is performed unless  some additional unexpected,
independent and unfores een  ha ppening occur s  which  . . . brings
about the result  . . . .”56
Policies such as  the one at issue also typical ly exclude from
coverage injuries tha t ar e “intended” from the sta ndpoint of the
ins ured.57 Although courts vary in their definition of what
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58. For a  genera l  di scuss ion of  how var ious  cour ts  define “intent to injure” in
an ins ur an ce cover age  contex t, s ee Whit ak er , s upra note 1, at 415–16. Whitaker
notes:
Whether a court will f ind coverage . . . depends lar gely on the jurisdictional
interpretation of policy exclusions for injur ies  cau se d int ent iona lly  by . . .
the insured. The three primary interpreta tions take n by  court s a re : (1)
whether the i ns ure d inte nded to commit  the a ct a nd intended it “to cause
some kind of bodily injury;” (2) whether the insured had the “specific intent
to cause the type of injury suffered;” or (3) whether the insure d intended
the “na tur al  an d proba ble cons equences  of the i ns ur ed’s a ct.”
Id.  at  416 (footnote s omi tte d) (quoting P achuk i v . Repu blic In s. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898,
901 (Wis . 1979)). 
59. COUCH, supra note 50, § 44:289.
60. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
61. See, for  exa mpl e, S tate Farm  Fire & Casualty  Co. v. Po omaih ealani, 667 F.
Supp. 705, 709 (D. Haw . 1987) (citing Tr ansam er ica  Ins . Group  v. Mee re , 694 P.2d
181, 189 (Ariz. 1984), for the proposition that “‘the proper  interpretat ion of  the  clause
in question is that it excludes . . . covera ge when the insured intentionally a cts
wrongfully  with a purpose to injure’”); Mullen v. Glens Fa lls Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr.
605, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (“[W]hen a . . . policy excludes . . . injuri e s  . .  . that are
either ‘intended’ or ‘excepted,’ [sic] the policy is construed merely to exclu de . . .
injuries  . . .  res ul ti ng fr om a cts  in volv in g a n e le me nt  of wrongfulness  or
mis conduct . . .  .”).
62. State  Farm F ir e & Cas. Co. v . Ma rsha ll , 554 S o. 2d 504,  505 (F la . 1989).
consti tutes  an “intended” injury,58 the term i s genera lly us ed in
an insura nce context “to denote that the actor desires to caus e
the consequences of his a ct or believe[s] that some consequences
are s ubstantially certain  to result fr om his  act.”59 The la nguage
of a  typ ica l in tended inju ry  exclu si on clause  does not add an
additional  requirement that  the a ct producing the inju ry  a ls o be
“‘wrongful’ or ‘unju st ified’” in order for the exclusion to apply.60
Although some courts ha ve judicially i nferred such a
requirement,61 the F lorida  Supreme Court has  noted that,
bas ed solely on the pla in la nguage of the claus e,
[t]he i n t en t  unde r ly ing  an  ac t  of  se l f-de fense  where  the
defender in tends  to harm the  a tta cke r  i s  identi ca l  to tha t
under ly ing an  as sa ult. In each, the a ctor inten ds to inf l ict
ha rm  on  t he  ot h er . J u s t  a s  a s s au l t  i s  often impuls iv e or
react ive,  so  too i s  s e l f -de fense .  The  d i ff e rence  between the  tw o
l ies  in the motive or purpose  g ov e r nin g th e a ct . . . .
N e ve r th e le s s , such a cts  of  se l f-defense a re u ndenia bly
in tentiona l  an d ha ve been  held to be embra ced wi thin
intentiona l act exclus ions by a  ma jority of courts.62
Even where the i nsur ed argues tha t he had no ill will  or des ire
to hurt a n att ack er, but merely in tended to protect himself,
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63. Espinet v. Horv at h, 597 A.2d 307, 309 (Vt. 1991); se e also  Hartford Accident
& Indem . Co. v. Kr ek ele r, 363 F . Su pp. 354, 358 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (holding that where
an insur ed intended the movemen t of his  own a rm , the clenching of his own fist, and
the forceful contact between his fist an d another person, a finding that the injuries
were “intended” was “ines c apable”), rev’d on other grounds , 491 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.
1974).
64. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
65. Esp inet, 597 A.2d at  309 (quoting S ta te v . Glen s F al ls  Ins . Co., 404 A.2d 101
(Vt. 1979).
66. Id.  at  310.
67. See,  e.g., North Ca roli na  Fa rm  Bure au  Mut. Ins . Co. v. S tox, 412 S .E.2d 318
(N.C. 1992). Des pite  the  pre se nce of th e word  “expe cted” in th e ex clus ion cla us e, this
case rejects an appella t e  cour t’s  opinion that an injury fits under the exclusion clause
even though “‘there might well have been no specific intent to injur e,’ ” an d holds
tha t “the resulting injury, not merely the volitional a ct, . . . must be intended  for ”
the “expe cted or i nte nded” exclu si on to app ly. Id.  at  322 (quoting North Carolina
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox., 401 S.E.2d 82, 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). Even the
North Carolina Supreme Court recognized, however, that “[t]he chara cter of the
ins ure d’s a c t [could] ris e to the l eve l wh ich woul d requ ire  tha t a n int enti on to infli ct
an inj ur y be i nfer red.” Id. at  324. 
68. Preferred  Mut.  Ins . Co. v . Th ompson,  491 N.E.2d 688,  691 (Oh io 1986).
courts  applying the common definition of “intended” have
recognized that the ins ured “must  be taken  to hav e int ended a n
injury where the cir cums ta nces  indica te tha t he  kn ew h is  act
would da ma ge the in jur ed pa rt y.”63
F ina lly, policies  su ch a s t he one a t is su e typica lly  exclude
from covera ge injuries  which ar e “expected” from the
sta ndpoint of the insur ed. As  the Michigan Supreme Court
noted in Harrington, “[t]he policy ’s u se  of the word ‘expected’
broadens  the scope of the exclusion becaus e ‘expected’ injuries
are the ‘natura l, foreseea ble, expected, and anticipated result of
an intentiona l act.’”64 J urisdictions a pplying the “plain,
ordinary, and popular s ense”65 of the word “expected” have
readily determined that “[t]hough [legally] justified, an injury
inflicted by an act taken in s elf-defense may be expected.”66 On
the other hand, jurisdictions tha t require that the insu red
demonstra te something ak in to specific intent to injure in order
for the injury to be excluded seem to simply ignore the
“expected” prong of the inquiry.67
J urisdictions  holding that a n act tak en in self-defense is not
“expected” because it is merely an unpla nned “reaction to [an]
a ttacker ,”68 rely on faulty reas oning. Firs t, taking this
ar gument to its  logical extr eme, al l  acts are “unexpected” before
they a re pla nned; that a n act ta ken in self-defense often entails
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69. S ee Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau , 776 P.2d 123, 126 (Was h. 1989)
(recognizing that “[s]erious bodily injury, . . . was, from [the insured’s] standpoint,
obviously an e xpecte d r es ul t of  hi s  in te nt ion al a ct  of s hoot in g [th e a tt ack er ]”).
70. Auto-Owners  Ins . Co. v . Ha rrin gton,  565 N.W.2d 839,  842 (Mich.  1997).
71. Id.  (quoting Metropolitan Proper ty  & Lia b. Ins . Co. v. DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d
734, 746 (Mich.  1989)).
72. Grange Ins . Co ., 776 P.2d a t 126. 
73. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 841.
74. Id.  at  842.
75. State  Fa rm  Fi re  & Cas . Co. v. Mars ha ll, 554 S o. 2d 504,  506 (F la . 1989);
only a s hort planning period should not change the analys is.
Second, because the la nguage of these exclus ion clau ses  refers
to expected “injuries ” ra ther than “acts,” the focus of ana lysis
should be on whether, given the volitional char acter of the act,
the ins ured expected the res ult. The question is not whether the
insured “expected” to shoot an a ttacker when he left his home
in the morning; the question is, ra ther, given the fact that the
act of shooting was  deliberate, whether  the ins ured “expected”
the resultant injury.69
Thus, in light of the “plain, ordinary, and popular”
definitions  of the policy terms, an injury  simply cannot be
“accidental” where, as in Harrington , an insur ed admits that  he
deliberately  “pointed his gun at [a victim] and intended to shoot
him, hoping to stop [his] advance.”70 Simila rly, given the
deliberate  cha ra cter  of the defensive shooting, a finding that
the resulta nt injury is not expected or intended in the ordinar y
sens e of those te rms would, in the words  of the  Michiga n
Supr eme Court, “‘fl[y] in the face of all  rea son, common sens e
and exper ien ce.’”71 Because the language of the policy mentions
nothing about a “wrongfulness” qualification in order for the
exclusion clause to apply, the fact that a n insured is motiva t ed
to act out of a perceived need to defend himself “in no way
negates  the deliberate na ture of his act.”72 The language of the
exclusion clause  at is sue in Harrington simply states “we do not
cover  . . . bodily  injur y . . . expected or intended by an ins ured
person”;73 thus , the Mich iga n Supreme Court wa s correct in its
determination that, according to the “plain la nguage of the
policy ,”74 there wa s no coverage for injuries caus ed by the
insu red’s int entional a ct tak en in s elf-defense.
Because these “expected or intended injur y” claus es a re
unambiguous, court s  should not “rewr ite [the] policy . . . to
provide covera ge where the clear  language . . . does  not.”75 As
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s e e al so  Grange Ins .  Co., 776 P.2d at 127 (“We . . . will not rewrite  the policy here
to provide for coverage when the plain language of the policy does not.”); Home Ins.
Co. v. Ne ils en, 332 N.E .2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to “rewrit[e] the
contra ct agreed to by the parties  to provide any additional covera ge”); Espinet v.
Horva th, 597 A.2d 307, 310 (Vt. 1991) (“We may not read [a wrongfulness]
requirement in to t he  contr act .”).
76. Marsh all, 554 So. 2d a t 505.
77. Grange Ins. Co., 776 P.2d a t 127.
78. 694 P.2d 191 (Ariz. 1984).
79. Id.  at 195 (Holoha n,  C.J ., d is sen ti ng).
80. Gray v. Zur ich Ins . Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966). It is often said that
an insurer’s  “duty to defend is  broader than the duty to indemnify.” Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Ba rba ra  B., 846 P.2d 792, 795 (Cal. 1993). This principle has been
articula ted to ensure that a n insured will be protected ev en w her e a  su it m ay  be
“groundless,  fa ls e or fr au dule nt.” All st at e Ins . Co. v. Nova k, 313 N.W .2d 636, 638
(Neb. 1981). This oft-quoted language, however, does not suggest tha t  an insurer  has
an absolute duty to defend even where there is no possibility that the injury could
be covered under the terms of the policy; rather, the duty ar ises only “where
facts  . . . alleged . . . if proven, would render the insu re r l ia ble.” Grange Ins . Co., 776
P.2d at  124. 
81. Barbara  B., 846 P.2d a t 795.
the Supreme Court of Florida has  noted, “the sa nctity of the
pa rt ies  to freely  contra ct preva il s ,” even in a  cover age exclusion
context.76 Becaus e the right to freely contra ct and rely on the
plain meaning of the terms in a n agreement is s o vita l, even if a
court could identify a valid public policy reas on favoring
covera ge, courts s hould be reluctant to “invoke such public
policy  to overr ide the provisions of these policies .”77 As a
dissenting justice in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray 78 noted,
such disr espect for part ies’ ability to contra ct could be applied
to undermine any “attempt[] by [an] insur er to use si mple,
under sta nda ble l angua ge in  the poli cy exclus ion.”79
B. No Poss ibility of Coverage
It is generally  accepted that a n insurer ’s duty to defend
must be determ ined ba sed on whether  a  cla im aga inst a n
insu red person gives ris e to a “potential of liability.”80 This
potential in turn must be evalua ted in light of the “allegations
of the complaint” against the insured, as well as a ny “[f ]acts
extrinsic to the compl a int . . . [which] rev ea l a  poss ibi lity that
the claim may be covered by the policy.”81 Thus, where facts
suggest that the insured’s conduct may hav e been merely
negligent, the insurer r etains  a duty to defend even though the
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82. S ee Zelda  Inc. v . North la nd In s. Co., 66 Ca l. Rpt r. 2d 356, 361 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (ci ti ng Montr ose Ch em . Cor p. v.  Super ior  Cour t,  861 P .2d 1153 (Ca l.  1993))
(recognizing that to determine a duty  to defend, an insurer  must take into account
all  av ai la ble fa cts ). 
83. Auto Club Gr oup Ins . Co. v. Marzoni e, 527 N.W.2d 760, 768 (Mich . 1994)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Metropolitan Propert y & Li ab. In s. Co. v . DiCicco, 443
N.W.2d 734, 746 (Mich. 1989)); se e also  Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 272, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“An insured may not trigger  the  duty  to defe nd by
speculating about e xt rane ous  ‘fa cts ’ re ga rding poten ti a l l ia bi li ty .”).
84. Grange Ins . Co ., 776 P.2d a t 127.
85. Barbara  B., 846 P.2d a t 795. 
86. Id.
87. Auto-Owners  Ins . Co. v . Ha rrin gton,  565 N.W.2d 839,  840 (Mich.  1997).
88. Barbara  B., 846 P.2d a t 795.
89. S ee supra note 20.
90. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
91. Id.  (quoting Me tr opolita n P roper ty  & Lia b. Ins . Co. v. DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d
734, 746 (Mich. 1989)). 
complaint  may only allege intentional torts.82 However, as  the
Supr eme Court of Michigan has  pointed out, no duty to defend
can be manufactured where the contention tha t the ins ured
“did not intend or expect the injury ‘flies in the face of all
re a son, common sens e a nd expe ri ence .’”83
In cases  such a s the one under considera tion in Harrington,
where there is “no serious question”84 regarding the deliberate
chara cter of the insured’s a ct and the expected or intended
nature of the resultant injury, there is simply no “poss ibility
that  the claim  may  be covered by the poli cy.”85 Firs t, looking
solely to the “allegations of the compla int,”86 the pla intiff ’s
“wrongful death a ction”87 a ll eged intent iona l torts  aga inst the
insured. Second, even if the allegations of complaint included a
cla im that Harr ington negligently discharged his shotgun a t
Tew, the “[f ]acts extrinsic to the complaint”88 brought to light
during discovery, particularly Harrington’s a dmission during
deposition testimony that he deliberately  retrieved his s hotgun
and intent iona lly s hot Tew  wi th the pu rpose of st opping him,89
independently showed that Tew’s injur ies w ere “inten tional, or
a t least expected”90 and therefore outside the poss ible realm of
coverage under the “expected or intended” excl us ion cla us e. A
finding that Harrington’s a ct could have been merely negligent
under thes e cir cums ta nces  indeed “‘flies  in the face of all
reas on, common sense a nd experience.’”91 Thus, under
prevailing notions of insurance covera ge law, there can be no
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92. Barbara  B., 846 P.2d a t 795. 
93. S ee WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HAND BOOK  OF  T HE LAW OF TORTS  § 19, at  109–10
(4th ed. 1971) (“The defendant is not privileged to inflict a beating which goes beyond
the re al  or a ppa rent n eces si tie s of hi s own  defen se . If he does, h e is  commit tin g a
tort a s t o the ex ces si ve f orce . . . .”). But cf. Tra ns am er ica  Ins . Group  v. Mee re , 694
P.2d 181, 187 (Ariz. 1984) (opining that some courts “fix m ini ma l bl ame on one who
overreact s in s elf-de fens e beca us e . . . the  men ta l s ta te i nduce d in one  repuls ing a n
at ta ck is  di ffer en t f rom t ha t of  th e a tt ack er  (wh o commi ts  an ‘int en ti ona l t ort’)”).
94. S ee Gray v.  Zur ich Ins . Co.,  419 P .2d 168,  177 (Ca l.  1966).
95. 694 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1984).
duty to defend where an ins ured’s a ct is clearly intentiona l,
rega rdles s of whether i t is  jus tifi ed.
Articula ted in another way, there is no practical possibility,
based on the nature of the victim’s claim a nd the insured’s
proffer of se lf-de fense, “tha t the claim may be covered by the
policy ,”92 regardless of whether Harrington’s actions were
legally justifi ed by self-defense principles . On one hand, if the
t ri a l court were to find that Harrington’s us e of force was  not
justifiable  s elf-defens e, his  admi ttedly i ntentiona l a ct would be
an intentiona l tort, clea rl y outs ide t he covera ge of the policy.93
On the other hand, if the trial court were to find that
Har rington’s  use of force was indeed reas onable self-defense, he
would not be liable to Tew; the insurer w ould thus hav e no
reason to indemnify the claim. Therefore, based on the
generally  accepted s ta nda rd that a n insurer  only has  a duty to
defend where the damages sought are potentially within the
coverage of the policy,94 an i nsur er has  no duty to defend where
the liability of an  insured depends on whether an admittedly
intentional a ct either is , or is  not, self-defense.
 
C. Th e Reas oning  of Cas es  to th e Contrary  is  Unpers uas ive
Courts holding that injuries caused by the deliberate acts of
an insured in self-defense are covered by liability insura nce
policies, despite the pr esence of an “expected or intended
injury” exclusion clause, have articul a ted s evera l policy
considera tions  to justify their failure to give effect to the plain
la nguage of these policy terms . None of these policy arguments
is per sua siv e.
In Trans americ a Insuranc e Group v . Meere ,95 the Arizona
Supr eme Court  held tha t inju ri es  re sul ting from actions ta ken
by an insu red i n s elf-defense wer e indeed covered under a
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96. S ee id. at  184.
97. Id.  at  188; s ee als o, e.g. , All st at e Ins . Co. v. Nova k, 313 N.W .2d 636, 640–41
(Neb. 1981) (“[W]hen one acts in self-defense the actor is not generally a cting for the
purpose of intending any injury to another but, rather, is acting for the purpose of
attempting to prevent injury to himself.”); Farmer s Ins. Exch. v. S ippl e, 255 N.W.2d
373, 376–77 (Minn. 1977) (finding cover age w her e ins ure d’s act  of str ik ing an
ass ailant  in  sel f-def en se w as  “jus t a  ref le x a ct ion ”).
98. Meere, 694 P.2d a t 186.
99. Id.  at  189; s ee al s o  Fire Ins. Exch. v. Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 364 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (recognizin g tha t Ca li for ni a  courts  in fe r an “el em en t of  wrongfulness”
in a coverage exclusion).
100. 694 P.2d 191 (Ariz. 1984).
101. S ee id. at 194 (citing W. PROSSER, THE LA W OF  TORTS  § 8 at  31 (3d ed.
1964)).
102. Id.  at 193 (emphasis  added) (quoting Fi re  Ins . Exch. v . Ber ra y, 694 P .2d
259, 261 (Ariz. Ct. Ap p. 1983), mod ified, 694 P .2d 191 (A riz. 1984)).
103. Berray , 694 P.2d a t 193 (quotin g Fi re  Ins . Excha nge v . Ber ra y, 694 P .2d
259, 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)). In contrast, the California Supreme Court r ecognized
a  “common and ordinary ” definition of “intent.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v.  Admira l  Ins .
Co., 913 P.2d 878, 888 (Cal . 1995). 
104. Id.  at  194 (empha si s a dded) (quoting Pa tron-Oxford Mut. Ins . Co. v. Dodge,
426 A.2d 888, 891– 92 (Me . 1981)).
liability policy, despite the pr esence of an “expected or
intended” exclusion claus e.96 The cour t r ea soned tha t a lthough
the self-defensive act of an insured may  be undeniably
volitional, her “primar y intent” is to protect herself, not to
injure her as sa ilant.97 The court therefore held that, in an
“expected or inten ded injury” exclusion context, “the relevant
intent” is “the purpose which underlies the insured’s bas ic
conduct,” ra ther than the intent “tha t . . . accompanies  the
immediate act.”98 Thus an injury caus ed by the volitional a ct of
an insured is  only excluded from coverage if “the conduct which
led to the [injury] was intentionally wrongful from the
vi ewpoint  of the la w of torts .”99
 The Arizona S upreme Court expanded upon this “primary
intent” theme in Fire Ins urance E xch ange v . Berray .100 Here,
the court explicitly recognized tha t in most intentional tort
contexts, “intent” requires litt le more than tha t the act be
volitional.101 The court fu rther  noted tha t, in  what it  ca lled “a
narrow sens e,” “the act of shooting a person in self-defense is
intentional.”102 Despite this recognition of the ordinary
definition of intent, the court a dopted a “broader”103 definition
of the word, holding that “in order to constitute ‘intent’ in an
intentional  acts  exclu si on . . . the i nsured mus t des ire to h arm
the p laintiff.”104
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105. Auto-Owners  Ins . Co. v . Ha rrin gton, 565 N.W.2d 839,  842 (Mich.  1997).
106. Id.
107. State  Fa rm  Fi re  & Cas . Co. v. Pooma ihe al an i, 667 F. S upp. 705, 709 (D.
Haw. 1987) (quoting P re fer red Mut. Ins . Co. v. Thomps on, 491 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ohio
1986)).
108. Thompson, 491 N.E.2d a t 691.
109. Chis om v.  Roeme r, 501 U.S . 380, 403 (1991).
This reas oning utterly fails to take into considera tion the
la nguage of “expected or intended injury” exclusion claus es. The
fa ct that an insured may prefer not to have ever been involved
in a s ituat ion where self-defense becomes necessa ry does not
make her a ctions a ny les s “intentional” or the r esult ing injuries
any less “expected.” The language of these exclusion clauses
simply “does not qualify the injuries  excluded from covera ge
with ter ms  such as  ‘wr ongful ’ or ‘unjus ti fied.’”105 Additionally,
a s  has  been previously discussed, such reas oning also fails to
recognize that the use of the word “expected” in the exclusion
clause  “broadens the s cope of the  excl us ion.”106 Even if the
reas oning of the Arizona court could validly be applied to
determine whether injuries caus ed by an insured were
“inten tional,” it cannot be sa id that an ins ured who acts
intentionally  with force sufficient t o defend her self  from at ta ck
does not “expect” her action to cause some injury. The inclusion
of the word “expected” in the language of the clause ma nifests a
clear intent on the part of the dra fters of the contra ct that
exclusion of injuries not be determined bas ed solely on the
wrongfulness of the acts which caus ed them.
Other courts holding that a ctions taken in  se lf-defense  do
not fall under such an exclusion clause rea son that “the
ra tionale for . . . inten tional inju ry  excl us ion [claus es ] . . . [is to]
‘prevent[] individuals from pur cha s ing ins urance as  a s hield for
their anticip ated  intentional misconduct’” thus  a llowing an
ins urance company to accurately calculate its risk of liability.107
Therefore, becaus e “[a]n act of self-defense . . . is neither
ant icipated nor wrongfu l,”108 the rationale does not apply, and
coverage should be found. Thes e courts  ignore, however, that
the language of these policies mentions nothing about whether
an injury  is “ant icipated” or “wrongful.” Further, this
ar gument’s  “conclusion . . . does not follow from the premi se”;109
a s  the Supreme Court of Was hington has  noted, the fact that
the “law actually prohibits the purchase of insurance covering
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110. Gra nge Ins. Co. v. Brosseau , 776 P.2d 123, 126 (Was h. 1989). 
111. 637 A.2d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), aff ’d, 651 A.2d 859 (Md. 1995).
112. Id.  at  510; cf. Zelda In c. v. Northla nd In s. Co., 66 Ca l. Rpt r. 2d 356, 361
(Cal . Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting a policy excluding from covera ge injuries “aris ing
out  of a s sault or battery, or out of any act or omission in connection with the
prevention or suppression of an assault or battery”).
[wrongful] acts” does not necessa rily  mean  that  “acts  of self-
defense which are la wful are ther efore covered. That  which
public policy prohibits does not determ ine tha t which mus t be
consi der ed covered.”110
Still  another a rgument ha s been a dvanced that, even if the
la nguage of “expected or intended injury” exclusion clauses is
indeed clear a nd unambiguous, consumers  in the ma rk et for
liability insur ance ha ve  li tt le  opportunity to bar ga in for  the
omiss ion of such a claus e. This a rgument ignores  the fact that
insurers offer liabil ity policies which do not contain the
standard “expected or intended injury” clause. In Cochran v.
Aetna Cas ualty  & Surety  Co.,111 for example, the Maryla nd
Court of Appeals  dealt with an “expected or intended” exclusion
clause  tha t explicitl y did not apply t o injuries “result ing from
the use of reas onable force to protect pe rs ons or  propert y.”112
Thus, although a consumer ma y not be able to bargain for the
deletion or a ddition of terms  in any given policy, she does hav e
the option to “shop around” for the ty pe of liability coverage for
which she is willing to pay.
V. CONCLU S ION
 Courts  addressing the issue of whether injuries  resulting
from an intentional act tak en in self-defense a re covered under
a  sta ndard “expected or intended injury” exclusion clause
should restr ain thems elves from yielding to the temptation of
rewriting insura nce policies to accomplish res ults which,
although sentimental ly more appea ling, are not justified by the
policies’ clea r t erms . “Freedom of contra ct” reas oning is sound
and courts s hould enforce the plain language of these ty pes of
contra cts. The l anguage of such exclusion clauses clearly
manifes ts  the par ties ’ intent to exempt such results from
covera ge. Therefore, insura nce companies  must ha ve the right
to bargain for and rely on favorable terms in liability policies
which they is sue.
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